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The Mexican Case 
Carlos Sales-Sarrapy, Fernando Solis-Soberon, and 
Alejandro Villagomez- Amezcua 
This paper analyzes the  1995 reform of Mexico’s pension system. The reform 
substituted for the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) system a fully funded system with 
individual  accounts and a minimum pension guarantee. Section 4.1 reviews 
the basic characteristics of the old social security system in Mexico as well as 
the reasons to reform it. Section 4.2 discusses the main features of the pension 
reform approved in December 1995. We include an analysis of some specific 
features related to the design of the new system that are different from recent 
pension reforms in other Latin American countries. Section 4.3 discusses the 
costs of the reform on the basis of simulation results from an actuarial model. 
In section 4.4, we comment on some of  the likely effects of the reform  on 
saving and on the development of the financial system. The last section pres- 
ents final comments. 
Recent changes in life expectancy, population growth, and health-care costs, 
as well as an increased level of benefits without the corresponding adjustment 
in contributions, made the Mexican PAYGO pension system financially unsus- 
tainable. Mexico has joined the group of countries that chose to substitute for 
the state-run PAYGO system a defined-contribution fully funded scheme with 
individual accounts. As in most countries, the reform of the pension system in 
Mexico has important economic,  social, and political consequences. There- 
fore, a better understanding of this process in Mexico requires that it be put in 
a broad  perspective. The implementation  of  the  pension  reform  should be 
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viewed as part of a major transformation of the Mexican economy that started 
in  1988 and  that has  included  profound  structural  and macroeconomic  re- 
forms.' It should be stressed that the restructuring of the financial sector under- 
taken in the last few years has produced a radical change in the Mexican fi- 
nancial system. Measures such as financial deregulation, the strengthening of 
preventive regulations, and the modernization of supervisory bodies will be an 
important complement to the pension reform. 
4.1  Background to the Reform 
Social security in Mexico is provided by two major groups of  institutions. 
IMSS (Instituto Mexican0 del Seguro Social) and INFONAVIT (Instituto del 
Fondo Nacional  de  la  Vivienda  para  10s  Trabajadores)  provide  services to 
workers in the private sector, ISSSTE (Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Soci- 
ales de 10s Trabajadores del Estado) and FOVISSSTE (Fondo de la Vivienda 
del Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de 10s Trabajadores del Estado) 
to the labor force employed by  the public sector.? In 1992, SAR (Sistema de 
Ahorro para el Retiro), a fully funded system complementary to the existing 
PAYGO programs, was created on the basis of individual retirement accounts 
for every worker affiliated with IMSS or ISSSTE. 
IMSS provides insurance for health and maternity, old age retirement, sever- 
ance at old age, disability, life, child-care services, and workers' compensation. 
INFONAVIT is a housing agency managed by the government and representa- 
tives of labor and business organizations. It was created in 1972 with the pur- 
pose of providing affordable housing to workers employed in the formal sector 
and affiliated with IMSS. ISSSTE and FOVISSSTE provide similar services 
and insurance for workers in the public sector. 
Contributions to the social security system have become a heavy burden on 
private companies and workers and, given its current structure, a major source 
of distortion in the labor market. Table 4.1 summarizes current social security 
contributions for workers in the private sector. 
Health and maternity insurance has accounted for an average of 63 percent 
of total  expenditures of the  system during the  last thirty  years but  only 52 
percent of its revenues. During its fifty-one years of existence, the system has 
had only six years with a positive balance and has therefore placed significant 
financial pressure on other programs. Although, by law, every branch of insur- 
ance at IMSS should be self-financing, it has been a common practice to subsi- 
dize programs running a deficit. In particular, surplus funds from the pension 
I. For example, a major privatization program, trade liberalization, deregulation of financial 
markets, legal changes to allow private investment in  several infrastructure-related sectors, tax 
reform, and a significant reduction in government expenditures. 
2. There are several other public social security systems directed to the armed forces and work- 
ers at the public oil company as well as private retirement programs. These programs are small 
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Table 4.1  Social Security Contributions in Mexico as Percentage of Payroll 
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IMSS: 
IVCM 
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WCM = Invalidez, vejez, cesantia y muerte (disability, old age, severance at old age, and life 
insurance). The base salary on which contributions apply has an upper limit equivalent to ten times 
the minimum wage, except for the retirement SAR account and the health and maternity insurance, 
which are limited to the equivalent of twenty-five times the minimum wage. The base wage for 
INFONAVIT contributions is lower than for IMSS contributions. 
system have been used to cover expenses related to health and maternity insur- 
ance (IMSS 1995). 
Workers’ compensation provides insurance against accidents that occur on 
the job, including disability and death, and pays medical costs and compensa- 
tion  while  workers  are out of  work. Child-care  services were introduced in 
1973 as women’s participation in the labor force increased. IVCM3 is a defined- 
benefit PAYGO  system that provides insurance for old age retirement, sever- 
ance at old age, and disability and death.4 Historically, a significant portion of 
IVCM surpluses has been used to maintain the viability of the health branch. 
During the last ten years, social security expenditures have increased over 
60 percent in real terms, growing from less than 2.5 to 3.9 percent of GDP in 
1994.5  Pension expenditures have also grown very rapidly in real terms: IMSS 
pensions alone grew  150 percent during the period, increasing from 0.22 to 
0.56 percent of GDP, while IMSS and ISSSTE total pension expenditures in- 
creased 98 percent, reaching 0.8 percent of GDP in 1994. 
4.1.1  The Old Pension System 
Mexico’s old pension  system consists of a defined-benefit  PAYGO public 
pension scheme. As mentioned above, most of this system is operated by IMSS 
for private-sector  employees and by ISSSTE for federal government employ- 
ees. The majority of  the working population in the formal sector is covered 
by  IMSS. The IMSS system is the one that was reformed in December  1995. 
Therefore, we will explain the old pension  system by  referring  to the main 
3.  See the first paragraph of sec. 4.1.1 below. 
4.  This insurance applies only if the worker dies or becomes disable as a result of an accident 
5. This section includes only figures for IMSS and ISSSTE. 
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features of the IMSS program, known as the disability, old age, severance at 
old age, and life insurance program (IVCM).6 
Evolution of  the IVCM-IMSS Pension System 
The IVCM-IMSS program was implemented in  1944 as a collective fund. 
The original IVCM-IMSS can be characterized as a partially funded defined- 
benefit scheme. The surpluses of the program were used to pay for investment 
or current expenditures  of  other branches of  IMSS. Its main features are as 
follows: 
Coverage. The program covers registered  employees participating in the for- 
mal private sector and self-employed workers (and their families) who volunta- 
rily choose to contribute to the system. In November 1995, 10.9  million people 
were affiliated with IMSS. Although this amount represented only 29.6 percent 
of the economically active population (EAP), it is estimated that it was almost 
80 percent of  the labor force in the formal sector.’ The ratio of  contributing 
workers to IMSS pensioners has fallen from around sixty-seven  workers per 
pensioner in 1950 to around eight in 1994. 
Contributions. This program is financed by contributions from the employer 
(70 percent), the employee (25 percent), and the government (5 percent). The 
total contribution for 1996 amounts to 8.5 percent of the base salary. This base 
salary, used to compute contributions and benefits, is the worker’s contractual 
wage plus other payments (such as bonuses).* The total contribution is distrib- 
uted as follows: disability and life, 3.0 percent; old age and severance at old 
age, 3.0 percent; medical services for the retired,  1  .S  percent; administrative 
expenses, 0.6 percent; and social assistance, 0.4 percent. In the case of workers 
earning the minimum wage, the worker’s contribution is paid by the empl~yer.~ 
Eligibility. In order to qualify for a disability pension, disability must be for- 
mally certified by IMSS. To be eligible, the worker must have contributed for 
at least 150 weeks. To receive an old age pension, the insured must be at least 
sixty-five years old (sixty for severance at old age) and have contributed for a 
minimum of 500 weeks. At a worker’s death, a survivor’s pension is paid to the 
widow  andor descendants or to surviving parents. In any case, the  insured 
must have contributed for at least 150 weeks. 
6. Severance at old age refers to the case when a worker loses his or her job and is over sixty 
years old, regardless of whether he or she resigns or is dismissed. 
7.  The number of IVCM pensioners at that time was around 1.2 million, of which 65 percent 
were receiving old age pensions and 35 percent pensions for widows, orphans, and other relatives. 
8. The base salary on which the contribution applies has a limit of ten times the minimum wage. 
9.  In Mexico, the minimum wage is set by  law, and employers are required to comply with it. 
This variable is used as a reference of the wage structure of IMSS affiliates. The monthly minimum 
wage in July  1996 was equivalent to U.S.$90.00. The average wage for workers affiliated with 
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Benejits. Benefits  for the disabled depend on the degree of  disability deter- 
mined by IMSS. The pension for an individual classified as totally disabled is 
70 percent of the last wage; for partial disabilities, adjustments are made ac- 
cording to the labor law. Benefits for old age and severance at old age depend 
on the contributing  period  exceeding  the  required  500 weeks.  Benefits are 
based on the average of the base salary of  the last five years divided by  the 
current minimum wage. Additionally,  all retired workers have the right to re- 
ceive medical assistance for themselves and their families. All pensions  are 
indexed to changes in the minimum wage. In  1995, the replacement  rate for 
the worker with the average wage path, after contributing twenty years, would 
be 50 percent.'O This percentage could reach 100 percent if the individual con- 
tributes for forty-five years."  The government guarantees  that the minimum 
pension  will not be  smaller than the minimum  wage.  Figure 4.1 shows the 
replacement rates under different assumptions about wage levels and contrib- 
uting periods. 
Reserves and Investment. Reserves should be invested in federal government 
bonds or in other assets of highly rated issuers as approved by  the National 
Banking and Securities Commission. The income and spending of each branch 
of insurance should be registered in separate accounts. These resources should 
be used to cover only the services corresponding to each branch of insurance. 
As explained  below, reserves  were not  constituted  or invested  according to 
the regulations. 
Tcuc  Treatment. Employers can deduct as expenses their contributions to IMSS. 
Workers pay taxes at the moment of retirement when they receive the benefits, 
but taxes apply only to the amount in excess of nine times the minimum wage. 
The Fully Funded Retirement Saving System (SAR) 
The Retirement Saving System (SAR) was established in 1992 as a manda- 
tory fully funded savings scheme to complement the public PAYGO system. 
The SAR program is a fully funded defined-contribution system based on indi- 
vidual accounts. Some of the main characteristics of  the SAR system are the 
following:  l7 
Coverage. All workers who are affiliated with IMSS or ISSSTE must contrib- 
ute to the SAR system. 
Contributions. Each worker has an individual bank account integrated by two 
subaccounts: one for retirement and one for housing. Employers pay 2 percent 
10.  The replacement rute is defined as the ratio of  the worker's  pension divided by  his or her 
1 I.  In  1995, the wage for the average worker was 2.8 times the minimum wage, and the average 
12.  A more comprehensive discussion of  the SAR is presented by Solis-Sober&  (1995). 
last salary. 
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Fig. 4.1  Replacement rates, IMSS, old system (% of final wage) 
of the base salary to the retirement  subaccount and 5 percent to the housing 
~ubaccount.’~  The funds in the retirement  subaccount  are invested  in direct 
loans to the federal government, while the funds of the housing subaccount are 
channeled to INFONAVIT. These contributions are in addition to the contribu- 
tions paid to the IMSS public pension  system. Worker can make additional 
voluntary deposits in their individual accounts. 
Benejfs. Workers are entitled to receive the total capitalized funds from their 
individual subaccounts in one payment or to purchase an annuity either at re- 
tirement or when they are entitled to receive a pension from IMSS because of 
partial or permanent disability. In the case of death, the funds are given to the 
beneficiaries chosen by the insured. 
13. The base salary to which this contribution applies has an upper limit of twenty-five times 
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Other Benefit Provisions. The insured has the right to withdraw as much as 10 
percent of  the total balance of  the retirement subaccount if  partial disability 
lasts longer than the period established by the social security law or in case of 
unemployment. The latter can be claimed only by workers whose balance in 
the retirement subaccount is no less than eighteen times their last contribution 
and only if there have been no withdrawals during the previous five years. With 
respect to the housing subaccount, if  the worker receives a loan for housing 
from INFONAVIT, the funds accumulated in the subaccount must be used as 
a down payment, and the employer’s contributions plus a worker’s contribution 
equal to 25 percent of his or her wage are used to pay the loan. 
Administration.  Contributions are deposited in individual accounts managed 
by  commercial banks. Banks are responsible for record keeping, generating 
financial statements, and making various required filings. They can hold the 
SAR funds for up to four days, after which time they must send them to the 
central bank (Banco de Mexico), in the case of the retirement subaccount, or 
to INFONAVIT, in the case of  the housing  subaccount. Commercial banks 
charge 0.8 percent  per  year  of  the  retirement  subaccount balances  for op- 
erating expenses.I4 
Investment. Funds in the retirement subaccount are channeled to the govern- 
ment as a direct loan. The government pays an interest rate for the use of these 
funds that must be no less than 2 percent per year, on a monthly basis, over the 
inflation-adjusted balance using the inflation rate of the previous month. Funds 
in the housing subaccount earn interest according to the remaining operation 
surplus for the corresponding year. Actual returns on the retirement subaccount 
have been more than 5 percent in real terms. However, returns on the housing 
subaccount have been negative. In 1995, the real return was -9  percent. 
Regulation. The regulatory  agency is the Comisi6n Nacional del Sistema de 
Ahorro para el Retiro (CONSAR), established in July 1994. Its main function 
is to determine the rules and procedures that will ensure the correct functioning 
of the system. This supervisory body is responsible for overseeing all the fi- 
nancial intermediaries that participate in the SAR system, except INFONAVIT. 
Tax Treatment. SAR contributions by the employer are deductible. Voluntary 
contributions by the workers are tax deductible up to a limit. Interest accumula- 
tion is tax free. Withdrawals are tax free to the limit of nine times the minimum 
wage in the case of the annuity option for the retirement subaccount. There is 
a higher limit for tax exemption if the employee chooses to withdraw all the 
funds at once. For the housing subaccount, withdrawals are not taxed at all. 
14.  This fee is divided between 0.5 percent for the bank and 0.3 percent for a clearinghouse 
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4.1.2  The Case for Reform 
The most important reason behind the reform was the increasing financial 
problems being faced by  the old IVCM-IMSS pension program, which ren- 
dered it financially unsustainable. Another important reason was the need to 
foster domestic saving. Finally, there were other significant distortions derived 
from the old pension system, in particular, distortions generated in the labor 
market owing to the fact that contributions paid did not necessarily reflect ben- 
efits received. 
Current Pension System Diagnosis 
Since the end of the 1980s, it was evident that the public pension system was 
facing severe financial problems as a result of its actuarial imbalance. Recent 
estimates of  the actuarial imbalance of  the IVCM system show that it repre- 
sents at least 80 percent of the Mexican GDP.I5 Therefore, it became evident 
that a complete restructuring of the pension system was needed. We stress the 
main causes of the IVCM financial problems below. 
Demographic Trends. The IVCM-IMSS program was being pressured by dem- 
ographic trends, in particular, the changing population  structure  and an  in- 
crease in life expectancy. Mexico's population grew at high rates, 3.7 percent 
per year on average from 1970 to 1990. Recent estimates yield 1.9 percent for 
1990-95.  In 1930, the total population was 16.5 million, rising to 90 million 
in 1994. Despite the fact that the population pyramid shows a significant pro- 
portion  of  young people,  35.8 percent  of  the population  14 years old  and 
younger, the population measured as contributors to the social security system 
is aging very rapidly. Mexico's total population  is expected to be over  142 
million by  2030, and those over sixty-five years of age will represent around 
10  percent of that total. These trends imply that the ratio of retirees to workers 
would drive up the cost of the current pension system and generate major long- 
term financing problems. The elderly dependency ratio is expected to increase 
from 7.0 percent in 1995 to 14.8 percent in 2030. 
According to IMSS (1995), the expected average annual rate of growth of 
retirees for the next twenty years will be 5.7 percent, compared with a rate of 
2.6 percent for contributors. Moreover, this problem is being accentuated by 
an increase in life expectancy at birth, which has risen from 49.6 years in 1950 
to 70.8 years in 1995. Finally, there is a reduction in the fertility rate, which 
has gone down from 6.45 children per woman at the end of the fertility period 
in 1950 to 2.84 in 1995. 
The system has also been negatively affected by increased informality in the 
labor market and lower real wages. In particular, real wages in the manufactur- 
ing sector declined 44 percent between 1978 and 1995. 
15. This result is highly sensitive to the real interest rate assumed. 143  Pension System Reform: The Mexican Case 
InsufJicient Contributions. Current contributions will be insufficient in the me- 
dium and long terms to finance the increasingly generous benefits of  the old 
system that were extended to all the worker’s family. Originally, the system 
covered only the worker, not dependents. The minimum pension has been in- 
creased from 35 percent of the minimum wage before 1989 to 100 percent in 
1995, while contributions were gradually raised beginning in 1992 from 6 per- 
cent of the base salary to 8.5 percent in 1996 (it is important to remember that, 
from this contribution, 3 percent corresponds to life and disability insurance 
and 3 percent to retirement, severance at old age, and old age insurance). Ac- 
cording to IMSS (1996), contributions would have to be increased to 23.3 per- 
cent of  the base salary in 2020 to avoid a cash-flow deficit in the system in 
that year. 
Weak Relation between Contributions and BeneJits.  There is almost no relation 
between benefits received and lifetime contributions paid, which encourages 
evasion, underreporting of wages, and informality in the labor market. For ex- 
ample, on average, IMSS pays each insured worker a pension for a period of 
eighteen years and the corresponding widow’s pension for twelve years more. 
Together, this amounts to a thirty-year pension toward which the worker can 
have contributed for as few as ten years, the required vesting period. (Workers 
who contributed for fewer than ten years receive no benefits at all.) Finally, the 
reference base salary used to calculate the pension is based on the average of 
the wages earned during the last five years divided by  the current minimum 
wage, not on earnings during all years of service. 
High Payroll Taxes. The marginal payroll tax rate is very high even for low- 
income workers. For example, for a worker earning between one and two times 
the minimum wage, the marginal tax rate is over 25 percent. For workers earn- 
ing more than five times the minimum wage, the marginal tax rate is close to 
40 percent. This raises labor costs, favors evasion, and induces informality. 
Growing Informal Sector and Low Coverage.  Another problem that pressures 
the financial position of the system has been the increasing size of the informal 
sector of  the economy. It is estimated that about 35 percent of  the EAP was 
affiliated with the social security system (including IMSS and ISSSTE) in No- 
vember 1995. 
Portability Losses.l6 Given the IMSS-IVCM and the ISSSTE pension system 
defined-benefit formulas, there are portability loses between different pension 
systems in Mexico. Employees with only one employer might receive higher 
benefits at retirement than employees with more than one employer. Moreover, 
16. Portability of benefits among different pension systems requires that benefits not be lost or 
diminished by shifting jobs in the formal sector. 144  C. Sales-Sarrapy, F.  Solis-Soberon, and A. Villagbmez-Amezcua 
some workers might lose all benefits if  they  change from a job covered by 
IMSS insurance to one covered by another program. 
Inadequate Use of Reserves. Another important problem with the IVCM-IMSS 
program is the inappropriate use of reserves, which has affected  its financial 
position. From its creation, the surplus generated by the pension program has 
been used to finance infrastructure requirements of IMSS and (partially) health 
and maternity insurance, which traditionally operated showing a deficit. These 
transfers of resources have strongly decapitalized the reserves of the pension 
system. A conservative estimate of expected IMSS reserves can be obtained by 
accumulating the annual net flows (contributions minus payments) of IVCM. 
Accumulated flows in each period were assumed to earn a real interest rate 
equivalent  to 3.5 percent per year. Under these estimates, reserves for 1994 
should have been around 11 percent of GDP. However, reserves in 1995 were 
close to 0.4 percent of GDP (IMSS 1995). It is worth mentioning that the level 
of  reserves presented  in the exercise is a conservative estimate of the actual 
reserves  needed  to make the system financially  viable because, in  actuarial 
terms, the contributions were not high enough to cover future benefits. 
4.1.3  The Savings Problem” 
The Mexican economy still faces a serious shortage of short-term savings 
and a severe scarcity  of  long-term savings. During the last seven years, the 
domestic saving rate declined.18 According to Banco de Mexico (1996) esti- 
mates, gross domestic saving reached an average of 20 percent of GDP during 
the 1980s, dropping to slightly less than 16 percent of GDP by 1994. The main 
contributing factor was a reduction in private saving, which declined continu- 
ously from a level of around 18 percent of GDP in 1988 to around 11 percent 
during the first part of the 1990s, showing a recovery since 1995. On the other 
hand, public saving has shown major fluctuations since the beginning of  the 
1980s.I9 In  any case, Mexico’s moderate level of domestic saving has consti- 
tuted a constraint for investment and has made the country more vulnerable to 
foreign capital flows. It is now widely accepted that, although foreign savings 
will continue to play  an important role in the medium and long terms, it is 
crucial to increase domestic saving as the main source for financing growth. 
The National Development Plan  1995-2000  stated as one of its main eco- 
17. A broader discussion of this issue can be found in Solis-Sober6n and Villag6mez (1996). 
18. As is well known, it is difficult to quantify the precise magnitude of this variable because 
of several measurement problems. Most of the existing estimates are drawn directly from national 
income accounts as a residual after deducting the balance of payments deficit on the current ac- 
count from estimates of gross domestic capital formation. There are other serious problems when 
breaking down gross domestic  savings into its components, private and public savings. These 
problems arise from different quantitative estimations, although in general these estimations offer 
similar trends. For a discussion of this issue, see Gil-Diaz and Carstens (1996). 
19. For a discussion of this issue, see Villag6mez (1993). 145  Pension System Reform: The Mexican Case 
nomic objectives the urgent need to foster domestic saving. The goal is to in- 
crease domestic saving 6 percentage points of GDP by the turn of the century. 
This requires an increase in both public and private saving. The creation of a 
fully funded retirement savings program is one of the elements of this strategy. 
In this sense, one of the objectives of the recent pension reform has been the 
creation of a system that could generate domestic saving to support economic 
development.  2o 
4.2  The Pension Reform 
Since the early 1990s, there was a generalized consensus that the social se- 
curity system, and in particular the IVCM-IMSS pension system, needed to be 
reformed. There was a long debate about the main elements of the reform and 
about the depth of the measures to be taken. The president submitted to Con- 
gress a proposal for a new social security law, which was approved in mid- 
December 1995, while the regulations regarding the operation of the financial 
aspects of the system were approved at the end of April 1996. 
4.2.1 
The reform substitutes for the old PAYGO  system a mandatory defined- 
contribution fully funded system with individual accounts, complemented with 
a minimum pension guarantee. Basically, this requires the improvement and 
strengthening of the individual capitalization fully funded scheme under the 
SAR system. This includes the development of transparent mechanisms for 
pension funds management that generate the right incentives for all partici- 
pants, the development of clear regulations and supervision processes for the 
management and investment of funds, a clear separation from other social se- 
curity benefits, a close relation between contributions paid and benefits re- 
ceived, and the design of an adequate transition mechanism.21  The main fea- 
tures of the new system are summarized below. 
Basic Operating Characteristics 
Coverage. The new system is mandatory for all workers in the labor force who 
are affiliated with IMSS. This includes all workers participating in the formal 
private sector and self-employed workers (and their families) who voluntarily 
choose to contribute to the system. 
Main Features of the Pension Reform 
Contributions. Contributions will continue to be made by employers, employ- 
ees, and the government, as shown in table 4.2. The former 8.5 percent of base 
wage contribution for IVCM will be divided into two parts: 4.5 percent will be 
20.  In a recent paper, Feldstein (1995) put forward several suggested tax reforms to stimulate 
21.  An  interesting  discussion  about alternative possible  reform proposals  can be  found in 
saving in Mexico. He also discusses the transition to a fully funded social security system. 
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Table 4.2  Contributions to the Pension System (%) 
Before the Reform 
Insurance  DOSL (IVCM)  RDO  LDA 



























Source: IMSS and CONSAR. 
Note: DOSL = disability, old age, severance at old age, and life insurance; RDO = retirement, 
severance at old age, and old age; LDA = life and disability. 
“The social contribution is equivalent to 2 percent of  the average wage of workers affiliated with 
IMSS. It was established at 5.5 percent of the minimum wage. 
accumulated in individual accounts, and 4 percent will go directly to IMSS for 
the provision  of life and disability insurance  (2.5 percent) and of health ser- 
vices for pensioners (1.5 percent). Additionally, contributions to individual ac- 
counts will include the former 7 percent contributions to SAR (2  percent for 
retirement and 5 percent for housing). There is a new “social contribution” by 
the government that is a fixed amount equivalent to 5.5 percent of the minimum 
wage in January  1997. This amount will be indexed to the CPI. For workers 
earning the minimum wage, total contributions to their individual account will 
represent  17 percent  of their  salary. For workers earning the average wage, 
total contributions will represent  13.5 percent.22  Funds in individual accounts 
(except the 5 percent that corresponds to housing) will be managed by special- 
ized pension  fund management firms, AFOREs (Administradora  de Fondos 
para el Retiro). In the case of workers’ compensation, the employer will pay a 
premium determined by a formula that includes the base wage and the loss 
ratio for each firm’s activity.”  The new law considers the possibility of volun- 
tary contributions from workers and employers to the individual accounts. 
Benejts  for Retirement or  Severance at Old Age. To be eligible for a retirement 
pension, the worker must be at least sixty-five years old. In the case of sever- 
22.  It should be noted that the social contribution in terms of the wage will tend to diminish as 
real wages increase. 
23.  The premium paid by each firm is obtained by  multiplying the loss ratio of the firm  (based 
on the percentage of permanent, partial and total disabilities, the number of deaths, and the average 
active life of  a worker without an  accident considered by  this insurance) by  a premium factor 
(equal to 2.9) and adding to this amount 0.0025, the estimated minimum risk premium. The esti- 
mated premium will be revised on an annual basis. 147  Pension System Reform: The Mexican Case 
ance at old age, the age requirement is reduced to sixty years. Benefits depend 
on the contributions accumulated during the affiliate’s working life, plus the 
returns minus the commissions paid. Workers who have contributed for 1,250 
weeks can chose between two options: (a)  to purchase an annuity from a pri- 
vate insurance company that guarantees a fixed monthly  pension for the in- 
sured  and  their survivors  and (b)  to receive  programmed  withdrawals  from 
AFORE, calculated by dividing the balance (including interests) from the af- 
filiates’ individual account by the number of years that they are still expected 
to live.24  In the first case, an annual payment of at least the same amount of 
the minimum pension guaranteed by  the government  is required.  Otherwise, 
affiliates should take option b,  where the government minimum pension guar- 
antee is applied. If workers contributed for fewer than  1,250 weeks, they are 
not entitled to the minimum pension. However, they are allowed to withdraw 
the balance of their account all at once if they prefer not to buy an annuity or 
take programmed withdrawals. Early retirement is possible if workers accumu- 
late in their account the balance necessary to purchase an annuity at least 30 
percent higher than the minimum pension. 
Figure 4.2 shows the replacement rates under the new fully funded scheme 
for workers with the average wage path. These rates assume that the worker 
used neither the retirement funds for marriage expenses or when unemployed 
nor the housing funds for mortgage loans. Note that the discontinuity at 0 per- 
cent real interest rate in the graph is explained by the fact that, for a contribut- 
ing period under twenty-five years, workers have no right to receive the guaran- 
teed minimum pension. For workers who have contributed for twenty years, a 
7 percent real interest rate would be required to guarantee a pension equal to 
the one they could have obtained under the old system. It must be said, how- 
ever, that, under the old system, contributions would have been insufficient to 
finance such a pension. 
The replacement rates are highly sensitive to the contribution period and the 
interest rate. For example, given a 6 percent real interest rate for the retirement 
subaccount and 0 percent for the housing subaccount, an increase in the con- 
tributing period from twenty-five to thirty  years raises the replacement rate 
from 52.5 to 74.5 percent.25  Regarding the interest rate, workers with a twenty- 
five-year contributing period will have their replacement rate increased from 
68 to 78 percent when the real interest rate in the retirement subaccount in- 
creases from 8 to 9 percent. 
Benefits Due to Disability or Death. The risk of disability and death is covered 
by two types of insurance: workers’ compensation and life and disability insur- 
24. Programmed withdrawals are calculated tahng into consideration the age of the worker and 
his or her dependents. 
25. This is due to an  increase in the numerator (the result of  higher accumulated balances in 
the worker’s individual account) and a decrease in the denominator (the result of the reduction in 
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Fig. 4.2  Replacement rates, IMSS, new system (% of final wage) 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Nore: It is assumed that the IMSS housing subaccount is accumulated with a zero real interest rate. 
ance. Both are provided solely by  IMSS. When a covered accident occurs at 
the workplace, workers’ compensation applies. Workers who become disabled 
under such circumstances will receive  100 percent of their current wage for a 
period  of  time not  to exceed one year, during  which  IMSS will  determine 
whether the disability is permanent or temporary. If the disability is determined 
to be permanent, IMSS will decide whether it is total or partial. Workers de- 
clared totally disabled will receive 70 percent of their current wage.26  Workers 
declared partially  disabled will receive  a pension  adjusted according to the 
degree of disability. Death benefits for the typical family with three children 
are 70 percent of the last wage received by the de~eased.~’ 
In the case of  disability or death that is not job related,  life and disability 
insurance applies. Eligibility requires a minimum contributing period of 250 
26.  If a disability is due to a work-related disease, the pension will be 70 percent of the average 
base wage of the last fifty-two contributing weeks. 
27. The widow will receive an amount equivalent to 40 percent of the insureds corresponding 
disability  pension, and  the pension of  each child younger than  sixteen (or twenty-five  if  still a 
student) represents 20 percent of  this disability pension. If  the deceased leaves neither a widow 
nor any children, the remaining dependents will receive a pension equivalent to 20 percent of  the 
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weeks. However, this requirement is reduced to 150 weeks if  the disability is 
greater than 75 percent. Total disability is declared when a worker cannot be 
employed at a wage greater than 50 percent of previous earnings. The amount 
of the pension is equal to 35 percent of the average wage, adjusted by the CPI, 
of the last 500 weeks of contributions. This pension also includes additional 
payments for relatives, with the result that, for an average family with three 
children, the total pension is equivalent to 51 percent of the average wage.28 
For pension benefits in the case of  death, the worker must have at least 150 
weeks of  contributions. For the typical family described above, the pension 
would  be  53 percent  of  the  average  wage  used  to calculate  the  disability 
pension.29 
In the case of  both  workers’  compensation  and disability and life, IMSS 
must pay workers or their beneficiaries a sum insured equal to the difference 
between the cost of an annuity, based on the benefits mentioned above, and the 
accumulated balance in the individual account (excluding voluntary contribu- 
tions). With  the accumulated  balances  and the  sum insured  paid  by  IMSS, 
workers or their beneficiaries must purchase the corresponding annuity from 
an insurance company chosen by the workers. If the accumulated balance is 
higher than the cost of the annuity, workers or their beneficiaries can withdraw 
the  excess funds or increase the benefits of the annuity. In any case, if the 
benefits are lower than the minimum pension, the government will make up 
the difference, allowing workers to purchase with the income flow an annuity 
equal  to the  minimum  pension.  These pensions  are adjusted  annually  ac- 
cording to changes in the CPI. 
Guaranteed Minimum Pension. The government guarantees a minimum pen- 
sion equal to the general minimum wage at the time of the reform. This pension 
will be adjusted for inflation according to the CPI. Table 4.3 shows the average 
yearly returns needed for workers to accumulate sufficient resources to finance 
a minimum pension, for different wage levels, in the cases of retirement at old 
age and severance at old age. 
Partial  Withdrawals from the Individual Accounts.  After  an unemployment 
spell of forty-five days, workers are allowed to withdraw at most 10 percent of 
28.  These additional payments include 15 percent of the pension for the wife and  10 percent 
of  the pension for each child younger than sixteen years or  10 percent of  the pension for the 
insured‘s parents (if there are no other beneficiaries). Workers who have no beneficiaries will re- 
ceive an additional  15 percent of their pension, or 10 percent if there is only one beneficiary. In 
all cases, there is an additional payment equivalent to 20 percent of the pension if  the insured 
requires permanent assistance. Finally, it is required that the total pension should not exceed 100 
percent of the average wage used to calculate the pension. 
29.  The widow will receive an amount equivalent to 90 percent of the insured’s corresponding 
disability pension, and the pension for each child younger than sixteen years (or twenty-five if still 
a student) will be equivalent to 20 percent of this disability pension. If the deceased leaves neither 
a widow nor children, any remaining dependents will receive a pension equivalent to 20 percent 
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Table 4.3  Minimum Pension Yearly Implicit Return (%) 
Base Wage"  Implicit Real Return 
1  9.81 
2  6.59 
3  4.31 
4  2.65 
5  1.23 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Note: Contributing period  = 1,250 weeks. Real wage annual growth equal to 2.5 percent a year. 
"Number of times the minimum wage. 
the accumulated balance in their retirement subaccount if  they have at least 
250 weeks of contributions and made no other withdrawals during the previous 
five years. On getting married, workers with  150 weeks of contributions may 
withdraw  from their  retirement  subaccount  an  amount  equivalent  to  their 
monthly wage; this benefit is granted only once. The benefits and operation of 
the housing funds remain unchanged. 
Tax Treatment. Contributions by the employer will be tax deductible, and com- 
pulsory contributions will not be taxable income for the worker. Voluntary con- 
tributions by the workers will be subject to favorable tax treatment, and interest 
accumulation will be tax free. Withdrawals will not be taxed up to a limit of 
nine times the minimum wage, and there is a higher limit for tax exemption 
when employees withdraw all their funds at one time. 
Administration 
Management. The management of  pension funds will be entrusted to private 
pension fund administrators (AFOREs), which will be regulated and super- 
vised by  CONSAR. These institutions should have as their only activity the 
management of pension funds. AFOREs will inform workers about the accu- 
mulated balances from their retirement, voluntary, and housing subaccounts 
but  will  manage the  resources only of  the  retirement  and voluntary  subac- 
counts. 
Individual Accounts. Participants must choose one AFORE. Affiliates have the 
right to transfer their accounts to another AFORE once per year. However, 
workers are free to transfer their accounts whenever the AFORE changes its 
commissions or its investment policies. 
Housing Subaccount. The 5 percent contributions to the housing  subaccount 
will continue to operate as before. These funds will be channeled to INFO- 
NAVIT. There will be a return on these funds according to the operating sur- 
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The Role of  the AFOREs. Each AFORE is allowed to operate several pension 
funds for its affiliates. Workers are allowed to invest their resources in one or 
several  of  the  pension  funds managed  by  their  AFORE.  In  addition,  the 
AFOREs’ main functions include record keeping, issuing valuation reports and 
financial statements, making various required filings, and paying benefits if the 
affiliate chooses the scheduled withdrawals option. Each pension fund, known 
as a SIEFORE (Sociedad de Inversi6n Especializada en Fondos para el Retiro), 
will have a committee that will make the investment decisions. 
The Role of  IMSS. IMSS will be responsible for the collection of contributions. 
It also has  auditing and enforcement  powers  to ensure that employers and 
workers comply with their obligations. Also, the approved law allows IMSS to 
own an AFORE as long as it complies with all the regulatory provisions. 
Central Account. Contributions will be deposited in an account at the Banco 
de Mexico while the individualization process takes place and the resources 
then transferred to the AFOREs and INFONAVIT. All information about con- 
tributions will be managed by  a centralized entity created for that purpose, 
supervised by CONSAR. If workers have not chosen an AFORE, the resources 
from their retirement subaccount will be deposited in this central account for 
a maximum period of four years, starting 1 July 1997. After this period, CON- 
SAR will assign  an AFORE to those workers according to criteria as yet to 
be determined. 
Commissions. AFOREs will be allowed to charge management fees as a per- 
centage of contributions or of the outstanding individual account balance, or 
some combination of  the two. AFOREs will not be allowed to discriminate 
against any of their affiliates.  Individuals will receive  differential treatment 
only in order to encourage permanence in the AFORE and to promote volun- 
tary savings. 
4.2.2  Regulation and Supervision 
CONSAR 
The regulatory and supervisory tasks will be performed by CONSAR. Its 
main functions are to determine the criteria and procedures that will ensure the 
correct functioning of the pension system. This supervisory body will have the 
power to grant and revoke AFOREs’ licenses, to monitor the pension funds, 
and to enforce its regulations. CONSAR is also responsible for supervising the 
operations and investment policies of the pension funds. 
Investment of  Funds 
The authorities have stated that the basic operating principles that will guide 
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invested only in approved and diversified assets. These assets include govern- 
ment securities, the securities of  state-owned companies, equity, private debt 
instruments, shares of other pension funds, and other debt instruments issued 
or endorsed by credit institutions. Investment in foreign instruments is allowed 
only in the case of  Mexican issuers. CONSAR will establish  limits on the 
amount of investment in specific securities as a share of the value of the fund, 
but it can at its discretion impose limits expressed as a share of each issuer in 
the total liabilities of  all issuers from the same sector. These limits are maxi- 
mum limits, and AFOREs are free to seek the highest returns under these rules. 
There are disclosure requirements with respect to the structure of  the invest- 
ment portfolio and the returns obtained. Finally, it is important to emphasize 
that the AFOREs are allowed to operate several pension funds but that at least 
one of those funds should contain only fixed-income securities, including in- 
dexed bonds. The law specifies no minimum guaranteed return, in either abso- 
lute or relative terms. 
AFOREs 
Minimum Capital and Fixed Capital.  AFOREs should always have fixed capital 
at least equal to the minimum capital required that is not subject to withdrawal, 
an amount to be determined by CONSAR. Foreign investors are allowed to 
own up to 49 percent of an AFORE’S capital. But, in the case of affiliates of 
countries that have signed an international  agreement with Mexico that in- 
cludes financial services provisions, such as NAFTA, foreign investment can 
rise to 100 percent. 
Investment Reserve. AFOREs are required to maintain an investment reserve 
known as a special reserve as a percentage of the total assets under their man- 
agement. This amount will be determined by  CONSAR. The investment re- 
serve must be invested in the same assets as the resources of the pension funds. 
Market Share Limits. Starting in 1997, and continuing for the next four years, 
the law has established a maximum market share limit of  17 percent for each 
AFORE. After this period, the limit will rise to 20 percent of the market. How- 
ever, CONSAR can approve larger limits. The law does not specify how the 
limits are to be determined; however, it is most likely that they will be based 
on the number of workers affiliated with IMSS registered at each AFORE. 
Other: AFOREs  must  meet  rigorous  information  disclosure  requirements. 
There will be regulations  regarding  marketing  and advertising. In  addition, 
AFOREs are not allowed to issue liabilities, provide guarantees, obtain loans, 
or control companies. 
4.2.3  The Transition 
As mentioned above, the new pension system began functioning on 1 July 
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receive disability and death benefits, 475,000 retirement pensions, and 265,000 
workers’ compensation.  Since the new system is mandatory, all workers  are 
required to switch to the new individual capitalization scheme and stop con- 
tributing to the old system as of  1997. In the following discussion, we distin- 
guish between current pensioners, or those already receiving a pension when 
the reform was enacted, and transition pensioners, or all active workers who 
have contributed to the IMSS-IVCM program before 1 July 1997 and therefore 
have acquired rights under the old system. 
IMSS will continue to pay benefits to current pensioners, but those benefits 
will be financed out of existing IVCM reserves and resources obtained directly 
from the general revenues of  the federal government. In the case of transition 
pensioners, the reform established the following procedure. Workers already 
contributing to the old system will now make contributions to the new system. 
When they reach retirement age, they will be able to choose the higher of the 
two pensions determined under the rules of the old system (using the IVCM 
benefit system [see sec. 4.11, including the SAR funds accumulated as of June 
1997 plus the returns from that date until retirement) and the new system (the 
funds accumulated in their individual account). If they choose the latter, the 
new rules apply. If they choose the former, the pension will be calculated as if 
they had contributed to the old system during the time that they were actually 
contributing to the new one, and the pension will be financed with funds from 
their individual account complemented by government resources. 
4.2.4  Analysis of  the New Pension System Design 
It is clear that successful pension  system reform depends crucially on the 
design of the regulatory and supervisory framework. Obviously, there is no 
evidence yet with which to evaluate the Mexican reform, but, given the exten- 
sive documentation of design problems discovered in recent, similar reforms 
in other Latin American countries, discussion of relevant issues can usefully 
highlight  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the  new  Mexican  pension 
system. 
The main advantages of the new pension scheme are that the new system 
respects acquired as well as expected rights of current workers and pensioners; 
that the  new  system completely replaces the old, facilitating the move to a 
more unified pension system; that transfers  between AFOREs are limited to 
one per year, reducing administrative costs; that AFOREs are allowed to oper- 
ate several funds; that the law does not establish a minimum guaranteed rate 
of return for the funds managed by AFOREs; and that there exist a centralized 
collection agency and a centralized data bank, potentially reducing administra- 
tive 
In particular, regarding the centralized collection of contributions by IMSS, 
30.  There is some evidence that there are economies of  scale that result from such centraliza- 
tion. For a discussion of this issue, see Diamond (1994), who characterizes the provision of  such 
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there is a potential gain to be  derived from the  reduction of  administrative 
costs (e.g., with respect to Chile) since there is some evidence that there are 
economies of  scale involved in the provision of this service. In order for this 
gain to be realized, adequate  supervision-limiting  potential  political risks 
and possible excessive administrative costs-is  required. Alternatively, a state- 
run agency (one closely supervised by CONSAR) or, as suggested by Diamond 
(1994), a clearinghouse collectively owned by the AFOREs and barred from 
making a profit (to prevent its use in a collusion to raise industry profits) could 
provide this service exclusively. 
Another important feature of  the new  system is the ability of  workers  to 
chose an AFORE, which introduces the element of competition.  While the 
potential long-term benefits resulting from competition are great, they might 
(as discussed by Arrau, ValdCs-Prieto, and Schmidt-Hebbel  1993) be limited 
in the short run-in  particular during the transition period-as  a consequence 
of the amount of information required by the decision to purchase a new and 
unknown product. Therefore, at the beginning, the costs implied by the learn- 
ing process will be relatively high. According to Arrau et al., under the new 
system there will be initially a low elasticity of individual consumer demand, 
favoring a monopolistic competition structure and resulting in high individual 
contracting costs and high marketing costs. 
The new system also incorporates what we consider to be problematic fea- 
tures: in particular, the prohibition against including foreign securities in the 
pension funds’ investment portfolios; the operation of the housing subaccount; 
the minimum pension guarantee; the disability and life insurance monopoly; 
the market share limits; portability problems; and the IMSS AFORE. We elab- 
orate on these issues below. 
Foreign Securities. The prohibition against including foreign securities in the 
pension funds’ investment portfolios is based on the argument that channeling 
long-term savings abroad is not desirable when those savings are urgently re- 
quired by the domestic economy. However, the possibility of diversifying the 
investment portfolio and minimizing risk is thereby inhibited. A more diversi- 
fied portfolio will work in favor of future pensioners. 
Housing Subaccount. The housing subaccount, which receives a contribution 
of 5 percent of the base salary, represents more than 30 percent of total contri- 
butions to the new system. These resources are not part of the pension funds 
managed and invested by the AFOREs and are channeled to INFONAVIT. The 
institute is structured in such a way that most of the risks are born by the savers. 
Returns on their savings depend on the operating surplus of the institute, which 
is the difference between interest payments actually collected by the institute 
and operating expenses and reserve creation. The interest payments received 
by INFONAVIT depend on the interest rate charged to the borrower, which is 
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cording to increases in the minimum wage.31  Total payments to INFONAVIT 
also depend on the employment situation of the worker. It is difficult for the 
institute to collect payments from unemployed workers, and it rarely forecloses 
on homes. The institute is also not always able to keep track of workers who 
change jobs, and, in many  cases, it does not continue to collect payments. 
These factors, as well as the labor market conditions and real wage behavior 
during recent years, have affected the operating surplus of  INFONAVIT and 
help explain the negative real returns on individual accounts. 
Minimum Pension Guarantee. It has been argued that a PAYGO system plays 
an important redistributive role by providing retirement income for the elderly 
poor. This implicit redistributive  function could be lost under a fully funded 
system. As Valdks-Prieto (1994) shows, the introduction of a fully funded sys- 
tem can raise long-run  income and welfare. However, a redistributive  instru- 
ment might still be needed, and a government-guaranteed minimum pension 
can perform this function. While it can be argued that a guaranteed minimum 
pension can raise moral hazard issues by increasing the fiscal deficit, it can 
also be argued that the government has the responsibility to assist the elderly 
poor. In this case, means-tested criteria might be in order. A positive feature of 
the minimum pension in Mexico is that it is indexed to the consumer price 
index, not to the evolution of real wages. Since, in the medium term, real wages 
should rise, the indexing of the minimum pension to the CPI reduces its rate 
of increase. 
Disability and Life Insurance. Under the new system, disability and life insur- 
ance will be provided only by IMSS, which will charge a fixed premium equal 
to 2.5 percent of the base salary. There are several problems with this arrange- 
ment. The cost is high compared to that observed for this type of insurance in 
other Latin American countries  where the pension  fund managers compete 
among themselves and purchase the insurance for their affiliates from an insur- 
ance company. In these countries, workers can choose the pension fund man- 
ager that offers the best conditions. For example, in 1995, the cost of this type 
of insurance in Chile and Argentina was, on average, 0.67 and 1.17 percent of 
the base salary, re~pectively.~~  In Mexico, IMSS will.have insufficient incentive 
to reduce the loss ratio and its administrative costs beyond what is needed to 
maintain the financial viability of the system, and therefore it is not likely that 
there will be a reduction in this premium over time. 
Market Share Limits. This provision may entail some negative effects to the 
functioning of the system. Although the conventional wisdom is that more con- 
3 I. Changes in the minimum wage are determined yearly by  a government commission that 
32.  The range is 0.4-1.73 percent of  the base salary in Chile and 0.32-2.18  percent in Ar- 
includes representatives of labor and business organizations. 
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centration implies less competition, a well-known result in the industrial or- 
ganization literature is that this is unambiguously true only for an  industry 
composed of  firms producing homogeneous products for which the strategic 
variable of  competition is quantity produced. For AFOREs, competition will 
be over commissions, returns, and services provided. Therefore, it is possible 
that, in the market equilibrium, the market share limits may imply that some 
workers will not be able to open an account in the AFORE of their choice. A 
higher social cost for the provision of services may also result if the cost struc- 
ture of the firms is not the same. 
Portubiliv. The new system still generates portability losses because the re- 
form affects only the IVCM-IMSS program, leaving unaltered other pension 
programs. In particular, it is important to emphasize that, as long as other pen- 
sion systems, like ISSSTE, remain unreformed, workers changing from a job 
covered by  IMSS to a job covered by other programs might lose pension ben- 
efits. 
The IMSS AFORE. The new  pension law  allows IMSS to manage its own 
AFORE, as long as it complies with the corresponding regulations. However, 
since IMSS also conducts the collection of all pension contributions and has 
audit and enforcement powers, there is a real risk of unfair competition, fa- 
voring  the IMSS AFORE, if  the authorities do not enforce the regulations 
meant to prevent this situation. 
An  interesting feature of  the new system is that transition workers will be 
able to choose the higher of the old- and new-system pensions when they re- 
tire. In other countries, such a situation has been managed through the issuance 
of recognition bonds. The Mexican scheme does not require the calculation of 
the present value of  past contributions or of  future expected benefits, as do 
systems utilizing transition bonds. This design recognizes that workers have 
acquired rights, and that recognition helps make the reform politically viable. 
However, one important problem with the Mexican scheme is that it creates 
some moral hazard problems. Workers could pursue riskier investment strate- 
gies knowing that they can always fall back on the benefits of the old system. 
Also, because of the distortions of  the previous system, workers could have 
fewer incentives to participate in the formal sector of the economy since they 
are eligible to obtain a pension under the old system after contributing to it for 
only ten years. 
4.3  Costs of the Current and the New Systems 
One crucial issue that shapes the long-term effects and determines the suc- 
cess or failure of a pension system reform that entails a shift from a PAYGO 
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income redistribution effects that may have long-term implications, affecting 
the achievement of the reform’s 
As a consequence of substituting a fully funded for a PAYGO system, the 
government  faces the problem of paying the pensions of  current pensioners 
and of honoring the claims of workers who have contributed to the old public 
pension system. This situation implies that government expenditures should be 
financed by higher taxes, a reduction of other government expenditures, or the 
issuance of new debt because contributions are now directed toward the new 
individual accounts. The size of these obligations may have an important fiscal 
effect on the government’s budget, while the way  this deficit is financed has 
important effects on intergenerational (between current and future generations) 
and intragenerational (between rich and poor) income redistribution. 
Basically, we can distinguish two ways of  financing this deficit. On the one 
hand, the government may issue new debt, trading the old, implicit PAYGO 
debt for new, explicit debt. Debt financing implies that, in the short run, na- 
tional saving, the capital stock, and the intergenerational distribution of  wel- 
fare are only marginally affected, by magnitudes that depend on the net effi- 
ciency gains of the reform. On the other hand, the deficit can be financed by 
raising taxes or cutting government expenditures. A completely tax-financed 
transition  is equivalent to combining a pension reform with a contractionary 
fiscal policy, and therefore there is a transfer of resources from current to future 
generations, encouraging higher saving rates and capital formation and raising 
future per capita income and wage levels. It is possible to have any combina- 
tion of both options. The net result will depend on the particular mix of instru- 
ments used to finance the tran~ition.~~ 
The size of the pension debt and the fiscal effect differ among pension re- 
forms depending on the degree of maturity of the old pension system, the size 
of the formal and informal sectors, the amount of benefits and its relation to 
contributions, and the performance of such macroeconomic variables as inter- 
est rates, output, and wage growth. 
33.  Arrau  (1990), Arrau  and  Schmidt-Hebbel  (1993).  Arrau,  Valdts-Prieto,  and  Schmidt- 
Hebbel (1993). Schmidt-Hebbel (1994), and Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel (1996) analyze these 
effects in the case of a representative economy and in the Chilean and Colombian reform experi- 
ences. These papers are based on a framework developed by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). The 
main features of the representative economy model used  are that households maximize lifetime 
utility, there is no intergenerational altruism, there are no borrowing constraints, and voluntary 
savings are higher than mandated savings. Households of a given cohort are identical to each other. 
There is no uncertainty, and the economy is closed. Labor is supplied inelastically, and market 
clearing allows continuous full employment. 
34. As explained by Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel (1993), the intermediate case was chosen by 
Chile. The government distinguished among two components of its pension debt: the part due to 
current PAYGO pensioners (operational deficit) and the part due to past contributions made by 
currently active workers to the old system (honored with recognition bonds). Debt was used to pay 
for maturing recognition bonds, and taxes were used to pay the operational deficit. 158  C. Sales-Sarrapy,  F.  Solis-Soberbn, and A. Villagbmez-Amezcua 
4.3.1 
In this section, we perform a numerical simulation of  an actuarial model 
that estimates the annual pension revenues, expenditures, and liabilities of the 
IVCM-IMSS pension program as affected by the reform under various circum- 
stances. This model is a partial equilibrium framework that treats relevant mac- 
roeconomic variables as given. Nevertheless, for our purposes, it is a useful 
instrument, one that allows us to deal with more disaggregation in a simple 
way, compared with a general equilibrium simulation model a la Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff (1987). 
The model is estimated for the two components of the transition fiscal cost: 
current and transition pensioners. We  call the sum of these two components 
total transition dejicit. In both cases, we consider pensions paid for old age, 
severance at old age, and disability and life insurance. The simulations include 
the case of  reform and the case of  no reform. The estimates are performed 
assuming different performances of  the main macroeconomic variables. We 
present a case that we  call full jiscal cost, which includes both the transition 
and the permanent cost of the reform. As explained below, the permanent cost 
of  the reform is a consequence of  the particular features of the new  system. 
The basic macroeconomic variables that shape the results are the real interest 
rate and the rates of growth of output, wages, and number of affiliates. 
Case 1: The Cost of the Transition 
We estimate the fiscal deficit derived from honoring the rights of current and 
transition pensioners, including pensions paid to widows, children, and other 
relatives.35  We perform the simulations for the period 1997-2047  for two sce- 
narios: one assuming low economic growth and the other assuming better eco- 
nomic conditions (see table 4.4). For each case, we also assume three different 
interest rates. Remember that, in the reformed system, transition workers have 
the option at the time of  retirement to choose between the pension granted 
under the old system or that granted under the new one. The decision will be 
determined by accumulated individual savings, which depend on the contribut- 
ing period, the real interest rate, and the real growth of wages. Throughout the 
simulations, it is assumed that the labor force covered by the new system will 
grow according to IMSS (1995) demographic  projection^.^^ Our assumptions 
about these variables satisfy the steady-state condition that real output growth 
The Fiscal Cost of the Reform 
35.  We constructed these simulations using publicly available information; they may vary from 
those constructed  by  others, depending on the demographic and macroeconomic  assumptions 
made. In particular, we do not consider changes in the age distribution; also, our fiscal cost esti- 
mates do not include workers’ compensation pensions, commissions paid by  the workers, or the 
SAR’s accumulated balances before the reform. 
36.  IMSS assumes that the number of affiliates will grow by  2.3 percent in  1997, 2.9 percent 
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Table 4.4  Actuarial Model Basic Assumptions (%) 
Real Interest  Real Interest 
Real Output  Real Wages  Rate,  Rate, 
Scenario  Growth  Growth  Retirement  Housing 
High growth  5  2.8  18‘1  0 
Low growth  3  .8  0 
is equal to real wage growth plus labor force growth (Harrod-neutral rate of 
technical pr~gress).~’  In all simulations, it is also assumed that the balance 
from the housing subaccount is accumulated with a zero real interest rate and 
that there are no withdrawals from the individual account during the contribut- 
ing period. 
High-Growth Scenario. Table 4.5 reports the estimated total transition deficit, 
as a percentage of  GDP, derived from the pension  reform  under the high- 
growth scenario. We  report only the first year, the last year, and the year in 
which the deficit reaches its maximum in our simulation period. The appendix 
figures show the evolution of this variable for the whole period. 
Assuming an interest rate of 3.5 percent, the total transition deficit rises from 
0.48 percent of GDP in 1997 to a maximum of 2.59 percent of GDP in 2035, 
falling to  1.87 percent of GDP in 2047. If  the interest rate is 6 percent, the 
maximum transition cost is 2.29 percent of GDP in 2035, falling to 1.76 per- 
cent of  GDP in 2047. Finally, if the interest rate is equivalent to 8 percent, the 
maximum transition cost is 1.99 percent of GDP in 2031, falling to 1.47 per- 
cent of GDP in 2047. 
Current pensioners’ deficit represents most of the total deficit in 1997, de- 
creasing continuously after that year. This deficit is not affected by the interest 
rate, but it does depend on the number of  current pensioners, including their 
widows and other relatives, as well as the increase in the minimum wage. The 
presence of  widows and other relatives explains why the operational deficit 
lasts for a long period of time. The deficit derived from the transition workers 
depends on the interest rate because, the higher the interest rate, the higher 
will be the funds accumulated in the individual accounts, and the lower the 
number of workers choosing the old system. Finally, both components of this 
37.  It should be noted that, if  the rate of  technical progress is  not neutral, our results will 
change. In particular, if wL  (where w is the wage rate and L is labor) grows at a higher rate than 
output, the cost will be higher because the pensions under the old system, which are an option for 
transition workers, are indexed by the minimum wage. 160  C. Sales-Sarrapy, F.  Solis-Soberbn, and A. Villagbmez-Amezcua 
Table 4.5  Total Transition Deficit, High-Growth Scenario (% GDP) 
Current  Transition 








































Source: Authors’ calculations. 
total transition deficit are affected by real wage growth since benefits depend 
on this variable. 
Low-Growth Scenario. Assuming an interest rate of 3.5 percent, the total tran- 
sition deficit rises from 0.48 percent of  GDP in  1997 to a maximum of 2.30 
percent of GDP in 2033, falling to 1.79 percent of GDP in 2047. If the interest 
rate is 6 percent, the maximum transition cost is 1.96 percent of GDP in 2030, 
falling to 1.41 percent of GDP in 2047. Finally, if the interest rate is equivalent 
to 8 percent, the maximum transition cost is 1.68 percent of  GDP in 2027, 
falling to 1.04 percent of GDP in 2047 (see table 4.6). 
Transition Cost Comparison 
To get an idea of the importance of the accumulated total transition cost in 
terms of GDP at present value with respect to other Latin American countries 
that have  carried out similar reforms, we estimate the cumulative transition 
fiscal cost relative to GDP for the complete simulated period. To  make our 
estimate comparable to other studies, we use an interest rate of 5 percent, equal 
to output growth. The total transition pension cost for the next fifty years is 
estimated at 82.6 percent of GDP for this scenario. If we compare this amount 
with the Chilean and Colombian cases, it turns out that the Mexican cumula- 
tive transition cost is lower. Using similar assumptions for these two countries, 
Schmidt-Hebbel (1994) estimates a cumulative cost relative to GDP of  86.5 
percent for Colombia and  126 percent for Chile. The difference in  these 
amounts can be explained, in particular with respect to the Chilean case, by 
the lower maturity of  the Mexican pension system, its younger population 
structure, and the lower population coverage of the system. 161  Pension System Reform: The Mexican Case 
Table 4.6  Total Transition Deficit, Low-Growth Scenario (% GDP) 
Current  Transition 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Case 2: Full Cost 
This simulation includes transition costs plus fiscal costs that are permanent 
as long as the new scheme is in place. The new pension system implies three 
additional government expenditures: the minimum pension guarantee, the “so- 
cial contribution,” and the government’s share of the global contribution for 
retirement, disability, and life insurance. 
As is shown in table 4.7, in the high-growth case, the total cost rises from 
0.77 percent of GDP in 1997 to 2.53 percent of GDP in 2031, falling to 2.02 
percent of GDP when an 8 percent real interest rate is considered. For medium 
and low interest rates, the maximum total cost relative to GDP is equivalent to 
2.96 and 3.39 in 2035 and 2036, respectively. The full cost declines to 2.46 
and 2.72 percent of GDP in 2047, respectively. 
In the low-growth scenario, as is shown in table 4.8, the total cost rises from 
0.77 percent of GDP in 1997 to 2.16 percent of  GDP in 2026, falling to 1.46 
percent of GDP with the high interest rate. For medium and low interest rates, 
the maximum total cost relative to GDP is equivalent to 2.54 and 3.05 in 2030 
and 2035, respectively. The full cost declines to 1.98 and 2.62 percent of GDP 
in 2047, respectively. 
Case 3: No Reform 
This case assumes that there is no reform and that the IVCM-IMSS program 
will continue indefinitely, Table 4.9 reports the simulation results for the high- 
and low-growth scenarios and the same demographic assumptions as the pre- 
vious exercises in this section. We do not report the simulations for each inter- 
est rate because results are not directly affected by  this variable. Given the 
current low level of IVCM-IMSS reserves, the effect of the interest rate on the 
simulation results is negligible. Table 4.1  Reform Full Cost, High-Growth Scenario (% GDP) 
Total 
Transition  New 

















































Source: Authors’ calculations. 
“Includes payments of benefits due to disability and life insurance. 
bIncludes social contribution and government contributions for retirement and disability and life 
insurance. 
Table 4.8  Reform Full Cost, Low-Growth Scenario (% GDP) 
Total 
Transition  New 

















































Source: Authors’ calculations. 
dIncludes payments of benefits due to disability and life insurance. 
bIncludes social contribution and government contributions for retirement and disability and life 
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Table 4.9  No Reform Fiscal Cost (% GDP) 
Year  High Growth  Low Growth 
1997  1.55  1.61 
2022  3.58  5.43 
2047  6.29  14.01 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The fiscal cost without reform, assuming high growth, rises from 1.55 per- 
cent of GDP in 1997 to 3.58 percent of  GDP in 2022 and to 6.29 percent of 
GDP in 2047. If  we assume low growth, these values are much higher; 5.43 
percent and 14.01 percent of GDP, respectively. Comparing these results with 
the values obtained for the full fiscal cost in the case of reform, it is clear that 
the cost of  not reforming the current pension  system would be much higher 
in the future. 
4.4  Macroeconomic Implications of the Reform 
Pension reform in Mexico can have important effects on labor market dy- 
namics, domestic saving rates, capital market development, investment,  and 
output growth. These elements will lead to improved overall economic effi- 
ciency, making it likely that the Mexican economy can enter a period of  sus- 
tainable growth. 
4.4.1  Labor Market Efficiency 
Even though the new pension reform does not involve a reduction in the 
ratio of pretax and after-tax wages, it does imply a substantial gain compared 
to the current PAYGO  system. The pension  reform makes the system work 
more as a mandated  benefit  scheme than as a pure tax, as benefits become 
more closely related to contributions. Therefore, it reduces distortions in the 
labor market (see Summers 1989). 
On the other hand, the minimum pension guarantee can have negative ef- 
fects on labor market efficiency. As interest rates and output grow, the number 
of low-income individuals will decline, reducing government exposure to the 
fiscal cost generated by pension guarantees. Nevertheless,  at the margin, the 
minimum pension deters workers from productive activities in the formal sec- 
tor: because future contributions will not imply more income at retirement, 
workers entitled to receive the minimum pension will have fewer incentives to 
offer additional labor. 
4.4.2  Savings 
Several studies have analyzed the transition from a PAYGO to a fully funded 
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specific countries, on  the basis of  the Auerbach  and  Kotlikoff  framework 
(  1987).38  The majority of these papers analyze the transition cost and the alter- 
natives for financing it, which, as discussed in section 4.3, can be reduced to 
two: tax and debt financed. 
Theoretical simulations for tax-financed reforms yield increases in station- 
ary saving rates of 3-5  percent of GDP (Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel 1993; Ci- 
fuentes and Valdis-Prieto 1994). For the case of  Colombia, it has been esti- 
mated that a tax-financed reform can increase stationary saving rates by  2.4 
percent of GDP. For debt-financed transitions, the representative economy ob- 
tains a reduction in long-term output of around 1-4  percentage points of GDP 
(Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel 1993),39  while steady-state saving is slightly low- 
ered. Partially debt-financed transition exercises yield intermediate results. 
These authors have  also explored the possibility of  liquidity-constrained 
consumers in the transition to a fully funded system.40  In this case, the new 
scheme forces individuals to a comer solution where their personal savings are 
increased to a higher level than originally desired. These exercises yield long- 
term GDP growth estimates as high as 16 percent for a closed representative 
economy and 4-14  percent for the Colombian case (Cifuentes and Valdis- 
Prieto 1994; Schmidt-Hebbel 1994). Mexican reform limits individual total 
indebtedness capacity since workers cannot use their accumulated balances as 
guarantees in other financial operations. 
Mexico’s transition is expected to be partially debt financed, but, at the time 
of this writing, the government has not announced the way in which it will be 
financed. To assess the effect of Mexican pension reform on savings, we under- 
took a simple and conservative estimation of the possible evolution of accumu- 
lated balances in the individual accounts. 
The exercise assumes real GDP growth of 3 percent per year, a real interest 
rate of 6 percent, and a real wage increase of 0.8 percent a year. It also assumes 
that the total fiscal cost is partially (50 percent) tax financed and that there is 
no reduction in voluntary private saving.4*  The increase in contributing workers 
behaves like IMSS pr~jections.~~  It  is assumed that balances in the housing 
subaccount keep their real value over time and that there are no withdrawals 
from any subaccount prior to retirement. 
Table 4.10 shows the accumulated balance in the individual accounts (in- 
cluding contributions and interest earned minus withdrawals from future pen- 
sioners), the fiscal cost per year as estimated in section 4.3, an implied reduc- 
tion in public-sector savings as the transition is partially tax financed, and the 
38.  The specific characteristics of the Kotlikoff and Auerbach framework are explained in n. 
39.  This result is driven by the future tax changes assumed by Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel. 
40.  Villag6mez (1993) found significant empirical evidence to support the liquidity-constrained 
41. Workers are supposed to have no voluntary savings. This strong assumption is possible in 
42.  For projections, see n. 36 above. 
33 above. 
consumers hypothesis in the case of  Mexico. 
the Mexican case considering current real wages and saving patterns. Table 4.10  Effects of the Reform on Savings (% GDP) 
Flows to  Public-Sector  Net Savings  Accumulated 
Accumulated  Individual  Total Fiscal  Savings  Annual  Savings 
Balances  Accounts  cost  Reduction  Increase  Increase 
Years  (A = Sum Bs)  (B)  (C)  (D = Yz  C)  (E = B  ~  D)  (C = Sum Es) 
~~ 
1  3.98 
5  13.16 
10  25.95 
15  40.07 
20  55.31 
30  88.2 
40  123.75 
2.21  .48  .24  1.97  3.74 
2.44  .52  .26  2.18  12.15 
2.72  .72  .36  2.36  23.66 
2.97  1.08  .54  2.43  35.7 
3.16  1.45  .72  2.44  47.88 
3.43  1.91  .95  2.47  72.35 
3.74  1.87  .94  2.8 I  98.57 
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estimated net financial savings increase, defined as the difference between an- 
nual flows into the individual accounts plus interest minus withdrawals and 
the public-sector savings reduction. Finally, it includes an  estimation of  the 
accumulated savings increase associated with the pension reform. 
As  can be  seen, net  saving can be increased by  around 2.18 percentage 
points of GDP in five years to around 2.81 percentage points after forty years 
of the introduction of the pension reform. This is a conservative estimate since 
it assumes low growth conditions and does not consider a positive real rate of 
return on the housing subaccount. 
4.4.3  Capital Markets 
Pension reform will produce a significant long-term increase in the availabil- 
ity of financial resources to the economy. This will promote further financial 
specialization and the creation of new instruments, especially those related to 
long-term investments. As can be seen in figure 4.3, total financial savings are 
highly concentrated in short-term instruments. Long-term instruments account 
for only 21.7 percent of total financial savings and 11.9 percent of GDP. With 
the pension reform, long-term instruments could reach 21.9 percent of GDP in 
2000 and around 45 percent of GDP in 2010. 
The capitalization value of the Mexican Stock Exchange in 1995 was equiv- 
alent to 44 percent of  GDP. If  we  consider the accumulated balances of  the 
individual retirement accounts estimated in the savings section and assume that 
AFOREs invest their resources as does a typical pension fund in the United 
States (60 percent equity and 40 percent debt), we could expect that total pen- 
sion fund participation in the stock exchange will be around 1.9 percent of the 
total during the first year and that after fifteen years it could reach around 15 
percent of GDP. 
The availability of  these resources will promote financial deepening and 
87.97 
n 
Fig. 4.3  Financial savings (M4N currency) 
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long-term investment. These gains could have a significant effect on invest- 
ment decisions and growth. 
4.4.4  Investment and Growth 
The National Development Plan 1995-2000  estimates that, in order for the 
Mexican economy to grow at the rate of  5 percent annually, Mexico requires 
an investment rate equivalent to 24 percent of GDP. The plan projects that this 
investment rate will be financed by domestic savings, representing 22 percent 
of  GDP, and foreign savings, equivalent to 2 percent of GDP. The domestic 
savings goal requires an increase in this variable of about 6 percentage points 
of GDP. 
From the results of the savings projections, and assuming that all new sav- 
ings are channeled to finance investment and not to reduce the current account 
deficit, the pension reform will directly generate savings that could finance 
close to 25 percent of the additional required investment by the year 2000. As 
the system matures, the effect of  the reform on savings will be higher, and 
therefore its contribution to investment and growth will be more significant. 
4.5  Concluding Remarks 
Pension reform is now a worldwide phenomenon forced by  changing eco- 
nomic, demographic, and social structures. In general, these processes have 
been part of major economic transformations. Social security reforms involve 
many different aspects in a complicated manner. There is no one way to pro- 
ceed, and each country has developed its own model. However, it is clear that 
any solution chosen should meet at least two requirements: financial and so- 
cial viability. 
This paper analyzed the Mexican pension reform and made some prelimi- 
nary assessments about its future effects on the Mexican economy. We  pre- 
sented and compared the most important characteristics of the old and the new 
pension systems. There were several factors that caused the reform. First, the 
old IVCM-IMSS system was financially unsustainable; second, the Mexican 
economy needs to increase its domestic saving rate. 
The  reform  basically  consists  of  establishing  a  fully  funded  defined- 
contribution system based on individual accounts with a minimum pension 
guarantee provided by the government. Total contributions amount to 13.5 per- 
cent of  the salary of  the average worker for accumulation in the individual 
accounts plus 2.5 percent for disability and life insurance, which is still man- 
aged by IMSS. 
The new Mexican system shares many common elements with other Latin 
American reforms. However, it also has its own advantages and disadvantages. 
The advantages are that the new system respects the acquired rights of current 
workers, that the old system is completely replaced by the new system, that 
administrative costs are reduced by  limiting the number of  transfers between 
pension fund managers to one per year, that pension managers are allowed to 168  C. Sales-Sarrapy,  F. Solis-Sober6n,  and A. Villag6mez-Amezcua 
operate several funds, that the law does not establish a minimum guaranteed 
rate of  return  for pension  funds, and  that  there  is a centralized collection 
agency and a centralized data bank. The disadvantages include that the funds 
are prohibited from investing in foreign securities, that the IMSS is the sole 
provider of disability and life insurance, and that the minimum pension is guar- 
anteed. Other disadvantages are the IMSS AFORE, the operation of the hous- 
ing subaccount, portability problems, and the market share restrictions. These 
situations should be modified in the future to further improve the new system. 
The fiscal cost of the transition to the new system is relatively low compared 
to similar reforms in other Latin American countries. The present value of the 
transition cost represents about 82.6 percent of GDP, lower, for example, than 
in Chile and Colombia. This mainly reflects the fact that the reform was under- 
taken when Mexico’s population was still relatively young. 
The reform will have a significant effect on financial savings. Accumulated 
balances in the individual accounts could reach 24 percent of GDP after ten 
years, around 48 percent after twenty years, and 72 percent after thirty years. 
This will increase the possibility of financing long-term investment projects in 
Mexico and will also promote more efficiency in the financial sector. 
Appendix 
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Fig. 4A.1  Cost of the reform, high-growth scenario (interest rate 3.5%) 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Noret  Trans. Ret. = old age and severance at old age pensions paid to transition pensioners. New 
Ret. = expenses in old age and severance at old age pensions for new pensioners. Trans. DL = 
disability and life pensions paid to transition pensioners. New DL = expenses in disability and 
life pensions for new pensioners. Contrib. = contributions. Cum Pens. = pensions of current pen- 
sioners. + Contrib.  +  Curr. Pens. 
+Trans.  DL  + New  DL 
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Fig. 4A.2  Cost of the reform, high-growth scenario (interest rate 6%) 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note:  For abbreviations, see fig. 4A.1. 
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Fig. 4A.3  Cost of the reform, high-growth scenario (interest rate 8%) 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note:  For abbreviations, see fig. 4A.  1. 3.5 
+ Contrib.  +  Curr. Pens. 
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Fig. 4A.4  Cost of the reform, low-growth scenario (interest rate 3.5%) 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Fig. 4A.5  Cost of the reform, low-growth scenario (interest rate 6%) 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: For abbreviations, see fig. 4A.  1 171  Pension System Reform: The Mexican Case 
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Fig. 4A.6  Cost of the reform, low-growth scenario (interest rate 8%) 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Note: For abbreviations, see fig. 4A. I. 
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Comment  Aaron Tornell 
This paper analyzes the transition of the Mexican pension system from a pay- 
as-you-go to a fully funded system. It gives a diagnostic of the old system, 
describes the institutions under the new system, and evaluates the macroeco- 
nomic consequences of the reform. The paper is very informative and provides 
a well-rounded evaluation of the reform’s implementation. My comments con- 
centrate on the possible macroeconomic  consequences  of the reform. They 
should be considered as simply speculative and complementary to the paper. 
The authors give two reasons why pension reform has been implemented in 
Mexico. First, the old system became insolvent. Second, pension reform will 
increase national saving, and this in turn will induce a higher growth rate, as 
occurred in Chile. 
Two issues determine whether pension reform leads to higher growth. One 
involves fiscal redistribution. The other has to do with the proper functioning 
of the regulatory framework. I consider each in turn. 
The first point I want to make is that pension reform is not a sufficient condi- 
tion for a higher saving rate. If pension reform is not accompanied by judicial 
reform, it is unlikely that the saving rate will increase. 
During the last quarter century, Mexico has enjoyed several episodes of oil 
windfalls, which were not permanent with perfect certainty. A puzzling aspect 
of these episodes is that the windfalls did not increase the saving rate in Mex- 
Aaron Tornell is associate professor of economics at Harvard University and a faculty research 
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ico. Moreover, they induced significant deteriorations of the current account. 
Mexico is not alone in this: Nigeria and Venezuela are prime examples of other 
countries that had similar experiences. One explanation for this response is 
that shocks were considered 100 percent permanent, but this is difficult to be- 
lieve since other countries experiencing similar shocks did not have such dete- 
riorations in their current accounts. Another explanation is that there was an 
institutional problem, that  there were some groups within  society with the 
power  to  appropriate fiscal resources and no  countervailing institutions to 
check this power. Thus, when the windfall occurred, groups simply became 
more voracious and appropriated more, and national saving and higher growth 
failed to materialize. Of  course, these mechanisms might not exist in devel- 
oped countries, but Mexico is not yet in that situation. 
Suppose, then, that pension reform is a success and increases workers’ sav- 
ings. This creates a windfall for the country relative to the status quo ex ante. 
If the same mechanism that operated with the oil windfalls operates now, ap- 
propriation in other areas of the economy may  increase. As a result, the net 
effect of pension reform on the national saving rate might be nil. This does not 
mean that pension reform should not be implemented. Rather, it implies that 
policy makers should not be content with the implementation of pension re- 
form alone as the way to increase productive investment. Policymakers should 
also implement judicial reforms to create countervailing institutions that will 
limit or eliminate the power of special groups to engage in discretionary redis- 
tribution. 
The previous discussion suggests that simplistic extrapolations of the Chil- 
ean experience, in which pension reform led to an increase in savings, might 
be misleading. The reason is that the political economies of Mexico and Chile 
are quite different. Pension reform in Chile was undertaken in the aftermath of 
a civil struggle and a military coup, in which several powerful groups lost the 
power to appropriate fiscal resources that they enjoyed in the 1960s. One could 
say that, in the Chilean case, the government was relatively autonomous. This 
is not the case in Mexico today. 
Let me shift now to the second issue, which is the proper functioning of the 
regulatory framework. The guaranteeing of  the pensions’ real return by  the 
government might  generate incentive compatibility problems with  pension 
funds’ managers. Thus, strict regulation is extremely important. Given the re- 
cent banking history of Mexico, this should not be taken for granted. During 
the early 1990s, after the privatization of the banks, there was a lending boom 
in which bank credit to the private sector increased 116 percent from 1990 to 
1994. This lending boom led to a quick deterioration of the quality of banks’ 
portfolios for two reasons. First, consumer credit increased exponentially. Sec- 
ond, banks engaged in risky off-balance  sheet investments. In the end, the 
government absorbed a big share of the costs associated with these risks. The 
problem cannot be traced back to a lack of regulatory law or the absence of a 
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the privatization was drafted, and the National Banking Commission had the 
power to oversee banks. The problem was that the commission was not suffi- 
ciently equipped to monitor the exponential increase in bank lending and in- 
vestment activities. 
Extrapolating  from the experience  with the banks in Mexico, one should 
emphasize the need for a very strict regulatory framework for pension manag- 
ers during pension reform, at least during the transition period. 
Discussion Summary  Jeffrey Liebman and Andrew Samwick 
The discussion began with comments  about Aaron Tornell's  suggestion that 
increased corruption might negate the gains of social security privatization. 
One participant said that Tornell's arguments were not arguments against mar- 
ket incentives such as privatizing social security; rather, they were an argument 
for liberalization of both the political and the economic spheres. Another par- 
ticipant questioned whether it was generally the case in representative agent 
models of rent-seeking behavior that investment would decline in response to 
a positive terms-of-trade shock. He suggested that there were not clear implica- 
tions from such a model. He also argued that there would be fewer possibilities 
for theft of the surplus from social security reform than from a terms-of-trade 
shock. A third participant argued that the effects of reforms on investment were 
likely to be the opposite of what Tornell claimed. Since the reforms were likely 
to boost private  and national saving, they would increase the confidence of 
foreign lenders, and this would lead to a greater inflow of capital from abroad. 
However, another member of the group said that Tornell was right about 
graft and corruption and said that the Mexican reforms are going to be a disas- 
ter. He said that, while it makes sense to have a single collection agency, Mex- 
ico has chosen IMSS, the most inefficient and corrupt agency in the govern- 
ment, for this  role. Another participant questioned  whether it was wise  for 
IMSS simultaneously to be administering the program and to be competing as 
a fund manager. He thought that it might be possible for IMSS to subsidize 
itself out of general collections of payroll taxes and therefore gain an unfair 
competitive advantage. Sales responded that he thought that IMSS was capable 
of doing a good job of collecting the revenues, but he agreed that it was prob- 
lematic for IMSS to be a fund manager at the same time that it has enforcement 
powers and the authority to sanction employers who do not comply with the 
social security law. 
It was pointed out that the housing funds run by INFONAVIT have been 
yielding -5  percent a year. Thus, if a rate of return of 9.6 percent is expected 
for the entire social insurance contribution and 30 percent is invested in the 175  Pension System Reform: The Mexican Case 
housing fund, the other 70 percent will have to yield an unlikely 15 percent for 
the typical worker to avoid relying on the minimum pension. 
The discussion turned to annuitization, and one participant asked whether 
Mexico had any previous experience with annuities. Sales reported that, under 
the old SAR system, all workers took a lump sum payment, with the result that 
there is currently no annuity market in Mexico. People who outlive their lump 
sum receive the minimum pension from the old IMSS system. 
Another participant expressed concern that Mexico was going to give people 
the option at retirement of choosing the maximum of the old system benefits 
and the new system benefits. He said that this would create a serious moral 
hazard problem and that people would buy extremely risky portfolios that con- 
tained a small probability of  a very high return. Sales agreed that there was 
indeed a risk that investors would gamble with risky investments since they 
could always fall back on the minimum pension. Indeed, he reported that he 
had spoken with a future pension fund administrator who was planning to offer 
a portfolio with exactly such a strategy. 
A member of the group questioned whether it was wise to turn implicit debt 
into explicit debt in a country like Mexico that often suffered from difficult 
macroeconomic conditions. Explicit debt can lead to exploding interest pay- 
ments and an economic crisis. 
In wrapping up  the discussion, Sales described three troubling trends in 
Mexican public finance. First, he said tax evasion is increasing. Between the 
first quarter of  1995 and the first quarter of  1996, the VAT  increased from 10 
to 15 percent. GDP and consumption fell by  1 percent over this interval. How- 
ever, tax revenues increased by only 15 percent in response to this 50 percent 
increase in tax rates. Second, he said that health care expenditures are consum- 
ing an increasing fraction of the government budget and that it would be impor- 
tant to keep an eye on the results of the recent reforms of health care financing. 
Third, he said that privatization of state-owned firms is proceeding very slowly. 